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This paper investigates the impact of fiscal policy on profits using panel data for 19 high-
income OECD countries during the period 1975-1999. We estimate a profit equation in which 
profits depend on a set of fiscal variables. Our empirical method is based on a consistent 
treatment of the government budget constraint, and we try to disentangle the effects of 
different spending and taxation items. As far as public spending is concerned, our results 
strongly suggest that capital expenditures are associated with higher profits, while 
expenditures on wages and salaries deteriorate profits. At the same time our results indicate 
that transport and communication expenditures increase profits, while the opposite holds for 
defense expenditures. On the revenue side, both direct and indirect taxation tend to decrease 
profits. However, a more detailed sub-division of direct taxation indicates that social security 
contributions have a neutral effect on profits. 
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1. Introduction 
A large number of policy making decisions rely on the key macroeconomic question of 
the nature of fiscal policy’s impact on the economy. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
impact of fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates has been extensively studied in the 
empirical literature.
1 However, some of the transmission channels between fiscal policy 
and  the  macroeconomic  aggregates  have  not  been  thoroughly  investigated;  the  one 
relatively under investigated channel that is the subject of the present paper is the effect 
of fiscal policy on profits.  
The role of profits as a key driving force of capital accumulation and economic 
activity has been of paramount importance in economic thinking since the time of Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo. More recently, Abel and Blanchard (1986), Phelps (1994), 
Alesina et al. (2002) and Garcia Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007) have provided models in 
which profits play a central role as a determinant of investment and growth. Given the 
importance of profits in shaping macroeconomic developments, it is surprising that   to 
the  best  of  our  knowledge     the  only  existing  empirical  study  that  investigates  the 
influence of fiscal policy on business profits is the one by Alesina et al. (2002).  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between fiscal policy and 
profits.  Our  approach  is novel in the following two aspects. First, following Kneller 
Bleaney Gemmel (1999, 2001) (hereafter KBG) our empirical method is based on a full 
specification  of  the  government  budget  constraint.  KBG  outline     their  method  is 
explained in the following section   that incomplete specification of the budget constraint 
results in substantial biases in parameter estimates. Additionally, KBG sub divide the 
government budget constraint in a way that allows us to take into account the quality of 
fiscal policy. On a panel of 22 high income OECD countries over the period 1970 95 
they find that an increase in ‘productive expenditures’ has a growth enhancing effect, 
while ‘distortionary’ taxation hampers economic growth.  
Second, although, for reasons discussed in the next section, our empirical analysis 
is  orientated  mainly  towards  the  economic  classification  of  expenditures  we  also 
                                                 
1 For the “Keynesian” and “non Keynesian” impact of fiscal policy see Beetsma (2008) and Hemming et al. (2000). 
Blanchard  and  Perotti  (2002),  Perotti  (2005)  and  Fatas  and  Mihov  (2001)  find  empirical  results  that  support  the 
Keynesian view of a positive government spending effect on consumption, while Burnside et al. (2003) find evidence 
for the RBC model’s prediction of a negative government spending effect on consumption. For a review of studies that 
investigate the impact of taxation on the cost of capital see Hassett and Hubbard (1996) and Chirinko (1993).    3
investigate  the  effect  of  the  functional  components  of  public  spending  on  profits.
2 
According to the Government Finance Statistics of IMF, government expenditures can be 
classified along two main lines. The economic classification that divides public spending 
into  capital  and  current  expenditures  and  the  functional  classification  that  serves  to 
distinguish transactions by policy purpose or type of outlay. Some broad categories of the 
functional classification are transport and communication and healthcare expenditures, 
each of which includes current and capital expenditures.  
We focus our study on 19 high income OECD countries over the period 1975 
1999. Regarding the economic classification of public spending, results clearly indicate 
that  capital  expenditures  have  a  positive  impact  on  profits,  while  the  coefficient  on 
current expenditures is statistically insignificant. Even so, when we disaggregate current 
expenditures we find that wages and salaries expenditures deteriorate profits, while non 
wage expenditures have a positive impact on profits. As for the functional components of 
public  spending  our  results  suggest  that  transport  and  communication  expenditures 
increase profits, while the opposite holds for defense expenditures. As far as tax variables 
are concerned, direct and indirect taxation seem to decrease profits. However, a more 
detailed sub division of direct taxation indicates that social security contributions have a 
neutral effect on profits. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data, 
specifies the econometric model and contains our basic findings. Section 3 then reports 
the results of extensive robustness tests. The last section concludes. 
 
 
2. Empirical analysis 
 
2.1. Fiscal data 
 
Our fiscal data are obtained from the Global Development Network Growth Database 
complied by William Easterly. Primary data for the proceeds are taken from Government 
Finance Statistics – an annual edition of the International Monetary Fund; and the data 
                                                 
2 This is the reason for using Global Development Network Growth Database, instead of OECD Economic Outlook 
database. The latter includes the functional classification of expenditures, but for a much shorter time span. At the same 
time, these databases are not comparable, since the former refers to central government accounts while the latter on 
general government accounts.    4
for  GDP  from  Global  Development  Finance  and  World  Bank's  ‘World  Development 
Indicators’. We choose this database since, to the best of our knowledge, it is the most 
complete  database  for  fiscal  elements  that  compose  public  spending  (economic  and 
functional  classification)  and  revenues  (see  Appendix  for  details  on  data  sources  and 
descriptive statistics). 
As far as the quality of fiscal policy is concerned, following Aschauer (1989) and 
Devarajan et al. (1996), the literature dealing with the growth impact of fiscal policy 
recognized that one should make a distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ 
public  spending.  In  general,  government  expenditure  components  are  classified  as 
productive, if they are included as arguments in the private production function and as 
unproductive if they are not. Similarly, taxation items can be classified either as direct 
(distortionary)  taxation,  if  they  affect  the  investment  decisions  of  individuals  or  as 
indirect (non distortionary) taxation if they do not affect the saving/investment decision 
[see among others Barro (1990), KBG and Mendoza (1997)]. Given that allowing for a 
disaggregation  of  the  government  budget  constraint  along  these  lines  seems  to  be  a 
promising way forward in the empirical literature on fiscal policy and growth and despite 
the fact that the classification of certain budget items can be debatable, we try  as much 
as data availability allows us  to adopt this approach in our analysis. Although, we do not 
use  the  a  priori  classification  of  government  expenditures  as  ‘productive’  and 
‘unproductive’ as in KBG, we let the data ‘do the talking’ [see among others Devarajan et 
al. (1996), Bose et al. (2007), Gosh and Georgiou (2008)].  
Turning to the classification of fiscal data, we sub divide public spending into 
capital expenditures and current expenditures. This is our basic classification. Although, 
later on we examine if any sub component of current expenditures have an impact on 
profits, while, alternatively, we experiment with the functional classification of public 
spending.  On  the  revenue  side,  we  classify revenue  as direct  (distortionary) taxation, 
indirect (non distortionary) taxation and other revenues (as in KBG).
3 Direct taxation 
includes taxation on income and profits, social security contributions, taxation on payroll 
and manpower and taxation on property, while indirect taxation consists of taxation on 
                                                 
3  We  consider  taxation  on  international  trade  as  a  form  of  indirect  taxation  sine  taxes  on  international  trade  and 
transactions in the OECD countries consist mainly of import and export duties.    5
goods  and  services  and  taxation  on  international  trade.  Additionally,  other  revenues 
contain non tax revenues and other tax revenues (not elsewhere classified). Finally, in our 
regressions we include the budget surplus (deficit).
4 All fiscal variables are expressed as 
a percentage of GDP. 
Given that, as mentioned in the introduction, our empirical method is based on a 
full specification of the government budget constraint we will next refer shortly to the 
relevant argument presented in KBG.
5 Let is initially suppose that we want to include in 
our empirical analysis all the elements of the budget constraint. In order to avoid perfect 
multi collinearity  one  element  should be  omitted.  At  the  same  time,  suppose that we 
choose to omit from our specification fiscal element Xm with estimated coefficient γm. 
This implies that the estimated coefficient γj for another fiscal element Xj, which we 
include in the estimated equation, will now equal (γj  – γm). Consequently, the standard 
hypothesis test of zero coefficient for the fiscal element Xj is in fact testing the hypothesis 
(γj – γm)=0 rather than γj=0. Therefore, if we want to get unbiased estimates for all fiscal 
elements, we should exclude from the regression fiscal variables with negligible effect on 
profits  (γm=0).  Regarding  the  interpretation  of  results,  coefficient  γj  measures  the 
marginal  impact  of  fiscal  variable  Xj  on  profits,  net  of  the  marginal  impact  of  fiscal 
variable Xm, which is the assumed implicit financing element.   
  
 
2.2. The profit equation 
 
The  empirical  literature  on  the  determinants  of  profits  is  mainly  concentrated  in 
identifying the determinants of sectoral rather than aggregate profits. A relatively large 
literature has attempted to identify the determinants of profits at the sectoral level using 
measures  of  the  market  value  or  accounting  profits  [see  among  others  Schmalensee 
(1989),  McGahan  and  Porter  (2002)].  The  determinants  include  firm specific 
characteristics as well as market structure and industry specific characteristics. On the 
                                                 
4  Overall  budget  surplus  is  total  revenues  and  official  grants  received,  less  total  expenditure  and  lending  minus 
repayments. It is worth noting, that in our regressions we do not include the very small components grants for the side 
of revenues and lending minus repayments for the side of expenditures. This happens for two reasons, first, because 
these elements reduce our sample significantly and second because when we include them in regressions, they turn out 
to be insignificantly related with profits.    
5 For details see pp. 174 175 of their paper.   6
other  hand,  the  existing  literature  on  the  determinants  of  aggregate  profits  is  rather 
limited.  Finkel  and  Tuttle  (1971)  have  been  the  first  who have  attempted  to  identify 
empirically  the  determinants  of  aggregate  corporate  profit  margin  by  using  capacity 
utilization, unit labour cost, inflation and exports.  
More recently Alesina et al. (2002) examined the effects of various fiscal variables 
on aggregate profits, proxied by gross profits per unit of capital in the business sector. On 
a panel of 18 high income OECD countries from 1960 1996 they find that an increase in 
government  spending  and  especially  in  government  wage  bill  can  reduce  profits  and 
investment. This effect takes place because an increase in the wage bill of the public 
sector leads to an increase in wages in the private sector and consequently reduces profits 
and investment.
6 On the revenue side, labor taxation seems to have a sizeable negative 
effect on profits and investment. According to Alesina et al. (2002), an increase in labor 
taxes raises the cost of work relative to leisure, leading to a fall of labor supply and a 
reduction in profits and investment. It is worth noting that the effects of government 
spending on profits and investment are larger than those of taxation. 
Our  first  concern  is  to choose  an  appropriate  profits  indicator  for  our  dependent 
variable. The two main sources of profit data are national account and corporate account 
data. We use here national account data since they cover the whole economy and are 
more consistent across countries and time. The national account measure of profits is the 
gross operating surplus.
7  Specifically, we measure profits as the gross operating surplus 
(% GDP), defined as GDP less compensation of employees and taxes (minus subsidies) 
on production, denoted as profits and obtained from the Annual Macroeconomic database 
of the European Commission. The empirical model we estimate is of the following form: 
                                         
it it z it m it Z M PROFITS ε λ   β β ι ι + + + + =                                                               (1) 
 
                                                 
6 See e.g., Finn (1998) for perfectly competitive labor markets and Ardagna (2007) for unionized labor markets.  
7 Generally, the measurement of profits at the macroeconomic level is subject to a high degree of uncertainty [see ECB 
Monthly Bulletin (2004)]. The net rate of return on capital can be an alternative measure of profits but its measurement 
of is affected by all the difficulties related to the calculation of the capital stock.   7
where M is a set of fiscal variables, Z is the set of ‘other’ variables that we use to control 
for country specific profits related characteristics. Finally,  i and λi are country and time 
specific fixed effects and εi,t is the error term.  
Of  course,  the  inclusion  of  country  and  time specific  effects  gives  us  the 
advantage of controlling for a large part of omitted variable bias. On the other hand, one 
quite difficult task of this study is to find appropriate control variables for the model 
specification.  This  difficulty  occurs  because  this  is  the  first  study  that  attempts  to 
introduce a set of control variables among the regressors in an aggregate profit equation. 
In the only relevant paper, Alesina et al. (2002) use as control variables two lags of the 
dependent  variable.  Therefore,  before  including  tax spending  variables  in  our  model 
specification, we experiment with several control variables that intuitively are considered 
to  be  important  for  the  determination  of  aggregate  profits.  The  following  control 
variables seem to have a significant effect on profits: 
(a) An indicator of the development of labour cost relative to labour productivity. Instead 
of using a measure of unit labour cost we construct an excessive wage indicator that we 
borrow from Malley and Moutos (2006). We obtain the ‘excessive wage’ indicator by 
estimating the regression: 
 
t t t P a a W η + + = ) ln( ) ln( 1 0                                                                                     (2) 
 
for each country
8 using annual data obtained from OECD Economic Outlook database 
(online version). In the estimated equation, Wt is the real compensation per employee and 
Pt is the productivity index. The residuals, ηt, estimated in this first step, are the excessive 
wage variable that we apply in the second step in equation (1).
9 Pagan (1984) show that 
using residuals generated repressors in a two step OLS approach, produce consistent and 
efficient estimators, while valid inferences can be made with the standard errors provided 
as output from the second step. Furthermore, both Pudney (1982) and Pagan (1984) argue 
                                                 
8 Qualitative results remain unaffected,  when we pool cross sections in equation 2, allowing for country and time 
specific characteristics.  
9 Before estimating our model, we tested whether fiscal policy has an impact on excessive wage indicator. Our results 
did not show an effect of fiscal policy on the part of wages that cannot be explained by productivity.  Moreover, given 
that excessive wage indicator is a generated regressor, for its construction we use the wider time range the database 
allows us for each country.               8
that our results from equation (1) are consistent as long as cov(ε,η)=0. We will examine 
the validity of this assumption in the next section using the Davidson and MacKinnon test 
of exogeneity.  
(b) A measure of competitiveness. Our next control variable is the real effective exchange 
rate index (reer) extracted by deflating the nominal effective exchange rate with price 
indices.  According  to  the  definition  of  the  International  Monetary  Found,  the  real 
effective exchange rate is computed as the weighted geometric average of the price of the 
domestic country relative to the prices of its trade partners. An increase in the index for 
each country indicates deterioration of competitiveness and vice versa. These data are 
from International Financial Statistics   an annual edition of the International Monetary 
Found (online version). 
(c)  The  state of  demand.    As  a  measure  of demand, we use the growth rate of final 
consumption  (consumption),  obtained  from  the  World  Bank's  ‘World  Development 
Indicators’ (online version). 
(d) The unemployment rate. Unemployment may affect profits through its impact on non 
wage labour cost. For example, the cost of searching for a workforce with the appropriate 
skills  may  depend  on  how  “tight”  the  labour  market  is.  These  data  are  from  OECD 
Economic Outlook (online version).  
It  is  also  worth  mentioning,  that  we  have  attempted  to  employ  in  our  model 
specification  a  series  of  other  control  variables.  For  instance,  we  included  obvious 
candidates  such  as  the  real  interest  rate  or  the  degree  of  openness  of  an  economy. 
However, these additional control variables did not have a significant relationship with 
the  profit  share,  while  including  them  in  our  specification  did  not  change  our  basic 
findings.  
Our  sample  spans over the period 1975 to 1999 and includes 19 high income 
OECD  countries:  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, 
Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  United  States.
10  Given  that  profits  depict  a  very  high 
cyclicality,  we  follow  the  standard  approach  of  constructing  5 year  period  averages 
(1975 79  to  1995 99)  so  as  to  minimize  business  cycle  effects.  Two  small  OECD 
                                                 
10 Our choice of country and time period of our sample is restricted by the (un)availability of data.   9
countries, Iceland and Luxemburg are excluded from the sample. At the same time New 
Zealand is dropped due to data unavailability. Finally, Greece has been excluded from the 
sample as an outlier. Although, there is no theoretical justification for dropping outliers 
from our sample, it would be of considerable concern if our results where driven by them. 
We have detected for the case of Greece that observations for variable profits are laying 
three  standard  deviations  above  the  mean  (three sigma  rule) 
11,  while  Hadi’s  (1992) 
method identifies them as outliers.
12  
 
2.3. Empirical Strategy 
 
In  this  section  we  perform  a  variety  of  specification  tests  as  proposed  by  modern 
econometric analysis for panel data. Results clearly indicate that two way Fixed Effects 
specification is the most appropriate to estimate equation (1). We start by employing the 
Breusch  and  Pagan  Lagrange  Multiplier  test  (see  test  N1  in  Tables  1 6)  for  random 
effects. The LM test is a test on the variance of the presence of country specific effects, 
with the null hypothesis indicating no unobserved heterogeneity ( i =   in eq.1) and the 
pooled OLS estimator as the most appropriate approach. For each model specification, 
the null hypothesis of no unit specific random effects cannot be accepted, which means 
that we cannot ignore the presence of country specific effects. 
Next,  in  order  to  check  if  between  Fixed  Effects  model  and  Random  Effects 
model  one  is  superior  to  the  other,  the  Hausman  test  (N2)  is  performed.  The  null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that regressors and the unobservable country specific 
random error are uncorrelated. As can be seen, the Hausman test clearly indicates the use 
of Fixed Effects model, while at the same time we cannot accept the joint insignificance 
of country specific characteristics (Prob>F=0.000). It is worth noting, that Fixed Effects 
are a reasonable way to proceed with panel data, as they always give consistent results, 
yet  they  may  not  be  efficient.  Baltagi  (2005)  argues  that  fixed  effects  model  is  an 
appropriate  specification  for  panel  data  analysis,  when  focusing  on  a  specific  set  of 
individuals,  which  fits  in  our  case  of  19  high income  OECD  countries.  It  is  also 
                                                 
11 The estimated mean (std.dev.) for profits, for the countries we include in the sample is 37.169 (4.367), while Greece 
has an estimated mean (std.dev.) of 62.197 (2.04). 
12 The Hadi (1992) method measures the distance of data points from the main body of data and then iteratively reduces 
the sample to exclude distant data points. We set the significance level for outlier cutoff at p=0.1.   10
important to check, with an F test (N3), whether time fixed effects should be included in 
our  estimated  model.  Results  strongly  suggest  the  inclusion  of  time  dummies  in  our 
regressions.  
To continue with, one problem we face when we use the Fixed Effects estimator 
is the assumption that the regressors included in model specification are not correlated 
with the error term. In fact, averaging the data allows us to control for a large part of 
simultaneity in our regressions, while the inclusion of country and time specific effects 
give  us  the  advantage  of  controlling  for  a  large  part  of  omitted  variable  bias.  
Additionally, although, it is very difficult to find appropriate instruments for all fiscal 
variables, we implement Davidson and MacKinnon exogeneity test (N4) for fixed effects 
panel or pooled data. A rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors effects 
on  the  estimates  are  meaningful.  Our  primary objective is to examine the exogeneity 
assumption for all fiscal variables and the excessive wage indicator. Therefore, initially 
we  consider  only  tax spending  variables  and the excessive wages as endogenous, but 
gradually we add in endogenous regressors all remaining control variables (except time 
dummies), without any qualitative difference for our results. Due to space considerations, 
we present the results when all explanatory variables are considered endogenous. We use 
as instruments the initial values for each 5 year period average of our sample. As can be 
seen, results clearly indicate that any endogeneity among the regressors does not affect 
our estimates.
13 
Next, we want to check the statistical properties of our panel, although, we know 
that when the time length of the panel is small this task becomes particularly difficult. 
The  first  hypothesis  to  be  tested  is  that  errors  have  equal  variance  across  units 
(homoskedasticity). For this reason our model is tested by performing a likelihood ratio 
test (N5), as proposed by Green (2000), of the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity versus 
the  alternative  hypothesis  of  heteroskedasticity  across  groups.  The  null  hypothesis  is 
strongly rejected, indicating the presence of groupwise heteroskedasticity. 
Second, our model is tested for serial correlation arising when error terms for one 
unit of one year correlate with those of the previous year as well as for contemporaneous 
                                                 
13 We perform Davidson and MacKinnon test separately for the fiscal variables and the excessive wage indicator, 
yielding the same results.    11
correlation  implying  that  error  terms  for  one  country  correlate  with  those  of  another 
country. Initially, we employ a test of serial correlation (N6) in the idiosyncratic errors of 
a linear panel data model, as discussed by Wooldridge (2002), which strongly suggests 
the  presence  of  first  order  autocorrelation.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  insufficient 
observations to test for cross sectional dependence. One possible solution would be to 
use  Feasible  GLS  estimator,  which  corrects  for  contemporaneous  correlation,  panel 
heteroscedasticity, and unit specific serial correlation. Although our qualitative results are 
not affected, as argued by Beck and Katz (1995), the correction for contemporaneous 
correlation  is  problematic  unless  T  is  considerably  larger  than  N.  Therefore,  our 
estimations  include  robust  standard  errors  to  both  heteroskedasticity  (Huber White 
sandwich estimators) and any form of intra cluster serial correlation. Since the clusters 
are countries in our case, this option corrects for intra country serial correlation. 
Finally, an alternative specification of our model would be to include a lagged 
dependent  variable  among  the  regressors  in  equation  (1).  Indeed,  we  employ  the 
difference generalized  method  of  moments  (GMM)  methodology  (Arellano Bond 
(1991)),  but  we  find  insignificant  coefficient  for  the  lagged  dependent  variable.
14 
Moreover, these dynamic estimators are designed for large N and small T panels, which 
in our case can lead to severely biased and imprecise estimates. Therefore, although we 
opt for excluding the lagged dependent variable we believe that our model is properly 
specified since on the one hand, we take 5 year averages, including time fixed effects and 




We  start  our  analysis  by  estimating  equation  (1),  using  the  set  of  control  variables 
described above. The results are reported in the first column of Table 1A. As can be seen, 
the coefficient on excessive wage is negative and statistically significant. As the theory 
predicts,  an  increase  in  excessive  wage  tends  to  increase  the  cost  of  production  in 
business  sector  putting  a  downward  pressure  in the profit share. The reer variable is 
negative and statistical significant, showing that deterioration in competitiveness of the 
                                                 
14  Roodman  (2006)  suggests  that  the  number  of  instruments  should  be less than or  equal to the number of cross 
sections. Since system GMM uses more instruments than the difference GMM, it is not appropriate to use system 
GMM for a panel of 19 countries.    12
home country is associated with a fall in the profit share. The coefficient on consumption, 
on the other hand, is positive and statistically significant, indicating that, as expected, a 
rise  in  demand  has  a  positive  impact  on  profits.  Finally,  unemployment  is  positively 
related with profits. This result may suggest that when unemployment is low firms face 
higher hiring and training cost since quits are procyclical. According to Akerlof et al. 
(1988) the opportunities for job switching are significantly greater when unemployment 
is low than when it is high. 
In  the  second  column  of  Table  1A,  we  model  profits  as  a  function  of  fiscal 
variables along with the control variables. As already mentioned, we have to omit one 
element of the budget constraint in order to avoid perfect multi collinearity. We initially 
choose  to  omit  budget  surplus  (deficit).  Our  results  indicate  a  neutral  effect  of  total 
expenditures on the profit share. On the other hand, an increase in taxation is negatively 
and significantly related to the profit share. In comparison with Alesina et al. (2002) 
results,  we  observe  that  although  the  coefficient  of  revenue  turns  out  statistically 
significant  and  has  the  same  effect  on  the  profit  share,  expenditures  don’t  seem  to 
deteriorate profits.  
Next, in column 3 of Table 1A, we omit expenditures, which seem to be a neutral 
financing element, while we include variable budget surplus in order to test our implicit 
assumption that the coefficient on budget surplus is insignificant. Results for variable 
revenues remain unaffected, while in line with our initial assumption, the coefficient of 
variable budget surplus is statistically insignificant. In the fourth column of Table 1A, we 
exclude from our regression variables expenditures and budget surplus, while revenues 
still have the same effect on profits. Finally, in the last column of Table 1A, we attempt 
to mis specify the budget constraint in order to examine the importance of omitting from 
our  regressions  only  elements  with  a  neutral  effect  on  profits.  As  can  be  seen,  the 
coefficients on variables expenditures and budget surplus, when financed by increased 
taxation, are negatively biased and statistically significant. This result clearly indicates 
the importance of omitting only implicit financing elements from our specification. 
                                               
Table 1A here 
   13
However, these aggregate results are not very informative, since, as stated in the 
introduction, theory predicts that different expenditure and revenue items may have a 
different effect on profits. The impact of fiscal policy on the marginal product of capital 
depends  on  various  factors  such  as  the  assumption  made  regarding  the  production 
function, the precise form of fiscal expansion, the way that the expansion is financed and 
the characteristics of the labour market [see among others Baxter and King (1993), Finn 
(1998), Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Ardagna (2007)]. Thus, the insignificant coefficient 
on expenditure does not rule out the possibility that some expenditure component have a 
significant relation with profits.  
As  a  second  step  in  our  analysis,  we  breakdown  public  spending  into capital 
expenditures and current expenditures, while tax revenues are sub divided into direct 
taxation, indirect taxation and other revenues. As can be seen from the results in the first 
column of Table 1B, the coefficient on capital expenditures is positive and statistically 
significant.  This result is consistent with several models that show that fiscal expansion 
in the form of a rise in public investment will increase the marginal product of capital 
either  directly  by  shifting  the  private  marginal  product  schedules  or  indirectly  by 
correcting market failures that led to the underinvestment of the private sector in the 
market  for  infrastructure.  [see  among  others  Murphy  at  al.  (1989),  Baxter  and  King 
(1993) and Fatas and Mihov (2001)]. 
In Baxter and King (1993) capital expenditures are considered an input in the 
production function of the private sector with a direct impact on the marginal product of 
labour.  Furthermore,  investment  in  infrastructure,  which  is  a  large  share  of  public 
investment, corrects the existence of market failures with positive externalities for the 
productivity  of  the  public  sector.  As  emphasized  by  Murphy  at  al.  (1989) 
“…infrastructure  can  be  a  particularly  appealing  area  for  state  intervention.  First, 
coordination issues are especially important since the infrastructure serves many sectors 
simultaneously. Second, the projects tend to be large and time consuming, so that capital 
market  constraints and  substantial  uncertainty  can  deter  private participation.  Third, 
projects  are  fairly  standard,  and  hence  ‘local  knowledge’  (Hayek  1945),  which  is 
perhaps the main advantage of private entrepreneurs over government, is not as essential 
as in other activities.    14
                                                 Table 1B here 
 
Turning to current expenditures, that in most of the cases consists almost the 90% 
of total expenditures, results reveal that it has no statistically significant effect on profits. 
This  may  explain  our  previous  result  of  a  statistically  insignificant  coefficient  on 
aggregate  expenditures.  Later  on,  we  disaggregate  current  expenditures  in  order  to 
investigate if their neutrality reflects the different effect of various components of current 
expenditures on profits.  
Regarding tax variables, direct taxation is negatively and significantly related to 
profits.  An  increase  in  direct taxation,  that  raises the cost of work relative to leisure 
(intratemporal  effect)  and  induces  individuals  to  work  more  when  taxes  are  low 
(intertemporal effect), will reduce labor supply and the marginal product of labour in a 
perfectly  competitive  labour  market.   Moreover,  in an  imperfectly  competitive  labour 
market, the pre tax real wage may rise with a negative impact on profits [see Alesina et 
al. (2002)]. We also find that indirect taxation has a negative and significant impact on 
profits. This result is more consistent with the presence of imperfect competition in the 
product market. Anderson et al. (2001) show that firms’ “markup” will depend negatively 
on the level of an ad valorem indirect tax implying that indirect taxation will have a 
negative  impact  on  profits.  Finally,  the  coefficient  on  other  revenues  is  negative  but 
statistically insignificant.  
Moving one step forward, in the second and third column of Table 1B, we drop 
current  expenditures  and  other  revenues,  which  are  both  found  to  be  insignificantly 
related with the profit share, while we introduce budget surplus. As can be seen, results 
for capital expenditures, direct taxation and indirect taxation do not change, while, on 
the other hand, budget surplus is insignificantly related with the profit share. Finally, in 
the regressions reported in the last three columns of Table 1B we omit the fiscal elements 
that appear insignificantly related to profits in our previous results. We do not omit from 
our estimated equation more than two neutral elements of the budget constraint –although 
this would have no impact on the results  because it would make harder to identify the 
assumed  implicit  financing  element.  As  can  be  seen,  once  again,  results  for  capital 
expenditures, direct taxation and indirect taxation remain unaffected.   15
3. Robustness Checks 
 
In  this  section  we  test  the  robustness  of  our  results  to  five  changes  in  the  model 
specification. First, we check if our findings are driven by outlier observations. Second, 
we use a different indicator to measure profits. Third, we use an alternative set of control 
variables. Fourth, we proceed into a further disaggregation of the budgetary data. Finally, 




3.1. Testing for outliers 
 
In order to check that our findings are not driven by the presence of outliers, we first re 
estimate equation (1) by excluding all observations with estimated error in the upper or 
lower  end  5.0 percentile  range.  This  procedure  reduces  our  sample,  but  it  has  the 
advantage of eliminating outlier observations. As expected, the adjusted R
2 of the model 
is improved by the exclusion of these outlier observations. Results in Table 2 reveal that 
neither  the  sign  nor  the  statistical  significance  of  any  of  the  variables  has  changed 
though.
16 Alternatively, using Hadi (1992) method we check the fiscal data for outlier 
observations. Results reveal two outlier observations for variable other revenues (Norway 
1990 94, 1995 00), but without any implication for our results.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
3.2. Alternative dependent variable 
 
In all preceding analysis we have adopted the gross operating surplus as the indicator to 
measure  profits.  At  this  point,  we  want  to  check  if  our  results  are  sensitive  to  this 
definition. For this reason, in this subsection we re run equation (1) using net operating 
surplus as the dependent variable. Net (of depreciation) operating surplus (% GDP) is 
defined as gross operating surplus minus consumption of fixed capital, and denoted as net 
                                                 
15 Due to space considerations, in Table 1B we report the results only for the disaggregated fiscal variables. Note, 
however, that we also checked for robustness using the aggregated fiscal variables, but our basic findings do not seem 
to be affected. 
16 Due to space considerations, in Table 2 we do not report our estimates after dropping other revenues together with 
current expenditures and budget surplus from our model.   16
profits. As can be seen in Table 3, results remain unaffected for all explanatory variables. 
It is also worth mentioning that, although, gross operating surplus is obtained by Annual 
Macroeconomic database of the European Commission, our results remain unaffected 
when we alternatively use the same indicator from OECD Economic Outlook database.   
 
Table 3 here 
 
3.3. Alternative control variables 
 
Next we want to replace control variables that are related with potential bias: Firstly, the 
use of a generated regressor such as excessive wage implies that measurement errors, e.g., 
for  productivity,  will  be  classified  as  excessive  wage  increases.  For  example,  even  a 
purely competitive economy with no excessive wage increases will give non zero values 
for the variable excessive wage. For this reason, instead of using excessive wage variable, 
we include in our model specification the two variables that we used for its construction. 
More specifically, we use labor productivity and the real compensation rate, obtained by 
OECD  Economic  outlook  database  and  denoted  as  productivity  and  compensation, 
respectively.  
Secondly, although we have found that the correlation between the growth rate of 
consumption and our fiscal variables is low, it is difficult to argue that fiscal policy will 
not affect the growth rate of consumption. For this reason, we alter the specification by 
using  the  initial  growth  rate  of  consumption,  obtained  by  World  Bank  Development 
Indicators and denoted as iconsumption. We use this measure for two reasons, firstly 
because is highly correlated with the growth rate of consumption, secondly because is by 
even less correlated with the tax spending variables. Note that our results regarding the 
impact of fiscal policy on profits would not change if we use iconsumption in all our 
previous  estimations.
17  As  can  be  seen  in  Table  4,  as  expected,  the  coefficient  of 
productivity  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  while  variable  compensation  is 
negatively  and  significantly  related  with  the  profit  share.  Finally,  the  coefficient  of 
                                                 
17 We re estimated regressions in table 4 by replacing excessive wage and consumption one at the time, while leaving 
all other control variables as introduced in table 1A, without any qualitative difference for our results.   17
iconsumption is positive but statistically insignificant. As far as the fiscal variables are 
concerned, they retain their sign and statistical significance, indicating that our results are 
not sensitive to these changes in model specification.    
 
Table 4 here 
 
3.4. Full disaggregation of budgetary data   
 
The next change we make to our estimated equation is to disaggregate even further the 
fiscal  variables  presented  in  Table  1B.  First,  we  examine  if  different  components  of 
current expenditures have any particular effect on profits. For this reason we deviate 
from  our  previous  specification  by  employing  the  basic  sub division  of  current 
expenditures into goods and services, interest payments and other current expenditures.
18 
As before, we omit from our estimated equation budget surplus, which is considered to 
be the implicit financing element. As can be seen, in the first column of Table 5, in line 
with our previous finding for current expenditures, we observe that all components of 
current expenditures are statistically insignificant, while all other fiscal variables retain 
their effect on profits. In line with our previous findings, both direct taxation and indirect 
taxation are still estimated to have a negative impact on profits, while the coefficient of 
other revenues is statistically insignificant.   
As a next step we disaggregate public spending. In the second column of Table 5 
variable goods and services is decomposed into wage expenditures and other goods and 
services. The former includes wages and salaries, while the latter includes all non wage 
expenditures. The coefficient on wage expenditures is negative and significantly related 
with  profits  at  the  10%  level.  In  Alesina  et  al.  (2002),  the  negative  effect  of  public 
consumption on profits is mainly attributed to a ‘labour market channel’. For instance, a 
rise in the public sector’s wages and/or public employment will raise private sector’s 
wages and reduce profits. On the contrary, we observe that other goods and services are 
significantly  related  with  profits  at  the  10%  level  probably  due  to  a  direct  positive 
demand impact of this category of government spending (e.g. spending on computers) on 
                                                 
18  Other  current  expenditures  are  current  expenditures  other  than  interest  payments  and  goods  and  services 
expenditures.    18
private  production.  In  the  last  column  of  Table  5,  we  include  variable  non wage 
expenditures that consists of capital expenditures and other goods and services, together 
with wage expenditures, interest payments as well as other current expenditures. As can 
be seen, in contrast with Alesina et al. (2002), the coefficient on non wage expenditures 
is positive and significantly related with profits. This result is mainly attributed to the 
positive and highly significant coefficient of capital expenditures. On the other hand, 
once  again,  wage  expenditures  are  negatively  and  significantly  related  with  profits. 
Regarding other current expenditures, a large part of which is transfers, we observe an 
insignificant  relation  with  profits. It  is  worth  noting,  that when Alesina  et  al.  (2002) 
include year effects in their estimated model the coefficient on transfer expenditures turns 
out to be insignificantly related with profits.  
Thus,  the  main  reason  for  obtaining  a  statistically  insignificant  coefficient  on 
current expenditures in Table 1B is that a ‘labour channel’ co exists with other channels 
emphasized by the literature that relate fiscal policy to either a rise in monopolistic profits 
or to a rise in the marginal product of capital [see among others Dixon (1987), Mankiw 
(1988), Startz (1989), Coto Martinez and Dixon (2003), Baxter and King (1993)]. 
Regarding the revenue side, direct taxation is broken down into income taxation 
(taxation on income and profits) and other direct taxation. In many cases, variable other 
direct taxation consists entirely of social security contributions. The coefficient of income 
taxation in the second column of Table 5 is negative and statistically significant. This is 
an expected result since income taxation will distort labour and capital decisions with a 
negative  impact  on  the  profit  share.  What  is  surprising  is  that  other  direct  taxation, 
although  it  represents  a  different  form  of  direct  taxation,  is  insignificantly  related  to 
profits.  This  result  can  be  explained by the fact that this variable consists mainly by 
payments for social security contributions that may not be considered by individuals as 
taxation, but rather as a form of compulsory saving.  
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3.5. Functional vs. Economic classification of expenditures 
 
So far we have used the economic classification of expenditures. At this point we want to 
investigate if any important functional component of capital expenditures (like healthcare 
and transport and communication expenditures) and/or current expenditures (like social 
security payments) have an impact on profits. So, our primary objective is to investigate 
the  impact  of  all  functional  elements  that  compose  “productive”  and  ‘unproductive’ 
expenditures as defined by KBG.  
  To  that  purpose,  initially  we  construct  variables  productive  expenditures  and 
unproductive  expenditures,  based  on  KBG  methodology.  Among  productive 
expenditures,  KBG  include  those  devoted  to  general  public  services  (gps),  defense 
(defense),  health  (health),  education  (education),  housing  (housing)  and  transport  and 
communication  (transport).  Additionally,  productive  expenditures  include  other 
expenditures, although results remain unaffected if we introduce this fiscal element as a 
separate  variable  in  econometric  specification.  On  the  other  hand,  unproductive 
expenditures  include  social  security  and  welfare  (social),  recreation  (recreation)  and 
expenditures on economic services (economic). The definition of productive expenditures 
and unproductive expenditures differs across columns in Table 6. In particular, in the first 
column we use the basic specification described above. In columns 2 to 7 each time we 
exclude from productive expenditures one fiscal element in order to introduce it as a 
separate variable in econometric specification. For instance, in the second column we 
extract general public services expenditures (gps) from productive expenditures and we 
include  it  as  a  separate  variable  in  specification.  We  follow  the  same  procedure  in 
columns 8 to 10 for unproductive expenditures. More specifically, in column 8 we extract 
social security and welfare expenditures (social) from unproductive expenditures and we 
include it as a separate variable in specification. This procedure allows us, on the one 
hand, to have a fully specified budget constraint, and on the other hand to investigate the 
relation of every functional component of public spending with profits.  
  Turning  to  the  results,  the  coefficients  on  productive  expenditures  and 
unproductive expenditures are insignificantly related with profits.  At the same time all 
tax variables retain their effects on profits. More specifically, direct taxation and indirect   20
taxation  variables  seem  to  deteriorate  profits,  while  other  revenues  variable  has  an 
insignificant  relation  with  profits.  Concerning  the  functional  components  of  public 
spending, we find that the coefficient on transport variable is positive and significantly 
related  with  profits.  This  result  is  consistent  with our pervious finding for a positive 
effect  of  capital  expenditures  on  profits  since  both  transport  and  communication 
expenditures are considered ‘productive’ expenditure that have a positive impact on the 
marginal product of capital and consequently of the profit share. On the contrary, we 
observe that the coefficient on variable defense is negatively and significantly related to 
profits indicating that a fall in defense expenditures would raise aggregate profits. In the 
literature,  there  is  much  controversy  over  whether  defense  expenditure  should  be 
considered  as  a  ‘productive’  expenditure  or  not.  On  the  one  hand,  such  spending 
promotes growth through technological innovations that spill over civil industries and/or 
increased  capital  stock  utilization  [see  among  others  Mueller  and  Atesoglu  (1993), 
Kollias et al. (2007)]. On the other hand, defense expenditures has been found to have 
growth/investment retarding effects mainly through misallocation of resources away from 
growing sectors, investment crowding out and inflationary pressures [see among others 
Smith (1980), Mintz and Huang (1990), Galvin (2003)].  
 




This paper aims at analyzing the impact of fiscal policy on profits. For that purpose, we 
estimate a profit equation that takes into account the fiscal policy of the government. In 
every  step  of  our  analysis,  we  respect  the  government’s  budget  constraint,  while  we 
disaggregate  it  in  a  way  that  allows  us  to  distinguish  between  productive  and 
unproductive  spending  on  the  one  hand,  and  direct  (distortionary)  and  indirect  (non 
distortionary) taxation on the other hand. 
We  conduct  our  empirical  analysis  for  19  OECD  countries  during  the  period 
1975 1999. Regarding the non fiscal variables, we find that profits depend negatively on 
the part of wages that is not explained by productivity and positively on the growth rate 
of  consumption.  As  far  as  fiscal  variables  are  concerned,  we  observe  that  a  rise  in   21
‘productive’ capital expenditures will tend to increase profits. On the contrary, current 
expenditures seem to have no impact on profits. However, a more detailed sub division 
of current expenditures reveals that wages and salaries expenditures deteriorate profits, 
while  non wage  expenditures  have  a  positive  impact  on  profits.  Concerning  the 
functional  components  of  public  spending,  we  have  indications  that  transport  and 
communication  expenditures  increase  profits,  while  the  opposite  holds  for  defense 
expenditures.  On  the  revenue  side,  both  direct  and indirect  taxation  tend to  decrease 
profits while a further disaggregation of direct taxation reveals that certain items such as 
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Appendix. Data sources and descriptive statistics  
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unproductive expenditures  Unproductive 
expenditures as a 
share of GDP (%) 
78  16.349  4.961  6.672  27.494  Own calculations 
based on KBG 
methodology, data 
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other revenues  Other revenues as 
a share of GDP 
(%) 
93  3.557  1.840  0.894  9.374  Own calculations 
based on KBG 
methodology, data 
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Table 1A 
 Benchmark findings 
Dependent variable:  profits  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Method:  FE
  FE  FE  FE  FE 
Omitted fiscal variable:     surplus  expend.  expend.,  
surplus 
revenues 
expenditures      0.043         0.243* 
    ( 0.38)      ( 1.87) 
           
revenues      0.247***   0.293**   0.277**    
    ( 3.23)  ( 2.78)  ( 2.53)   
           
budget surplus        0.076      0.138* 
      (0.83)    ( 1.88) 
           
excessive wage   0.318***   0.322***   0.318***   0.327***   0.316*** 
  ( 6.37)  ( 7.39)  ( 6.94)  ( 6.88)  ( 7.26) 
           
reer   0.034**   0.016   0.018   0.015   0.023 
  ( 2.11)  ( 0.79)  ( 0.91)  ( 0.68)  ( 1.23) 
           
consumption  0.626***  0.442**  0.403**  0.468***  0.479*** 
  (3.38)  (2.83)  (2.43)  (3.38)  (2.88) 
           
unemployment  0.177*  0.265**  0.277**  0.241***  0.290** 
  (1.97)  (2.22)  (2.48)  (2.97)  (2.38) 
Adjusted R
2   0.643  0.720  0.726  0.723  0.693 
Observations  79  77  77  77  77 
Specification tests           
N1  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N2  0.012  0.051  0.024  0.024   0.074 
N3  0.022  0.003  0.001  0.002  0.006 
N4  0.388  0.351  0.156  0.394  0.586 
N5  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N6  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes:  t statistics, calculated using robust and clustered standard errors, are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level,  
** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. All regressions include country and time intercepts.  
N1 = Breusch and Pagan LM test 
N2 = Hausman test 
N3 = F  test time 
N4= Davidson and MacKinnon test of exogeneity 
N5 = Likelihood ratio test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
N6= LM5 test for serial correlation 
P values are reported for the respective tests 
Table 1B 
Disaggregated Budgetary Data 
Dependent variable:  
profits  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Method:  FE
  FE  FE  FE  FE  FE 






 other rev. 
capital expenditures  0.547***  0.603***  0.593***  0.536**  0.544***  0.597*** 
  (3.07)  (3.59)  (3.64)  (2.82)  (3.00)  (3.40) 
             
current expenditures   0.055      0.011      0.081    
  ( 0.61)    ( 0.09)    ( 0.84)   
             
direct taxation   0.272***   0.346***   0.355***   0.281***   0.276***   0.364*** 
  ( 3.98)  ( 3.37)  ( 3.12)  ( 3.84)  ( 4.14)  ( 3.26) 
             
indirect taxation    0.548**   0.581***   0.559**   0.625**   0.506**   0.569** 
  ( 2.49)  ( 3.07)  ( 2.18)  ( 2.57)  ( 2.24)  ( 2.66) 
             
other revenues    0.115   0.137      0.156       
  ( 0.92)  ( 1.10)    ( 1.06)     
             
budget surplus     0.084  0.084        0.093 
    (1.02)  (0.76)      (1.03) 
             
excessive wage   0.391***   0.393***   0.407***   0.393***   0.401***   0.408*** 
  ( 7.67)  ( 8.17)  ( 9.55)  ( 7.28)  ( 9.02)  ( 9.83) 
             
reer   0.008   0.009   0.010   0.007   0.009   0.010 
  ( 0.44)  ( 0.53)  ( 0.59)  ( 0.35)  ( 0.52)  ( 0.60) 
             
consumption  0.359***  0.327***  0.322***  0.392***  0.345***  0.322*** 
  (3.90)  (3.35)  (3.30)  (4.04)  (3.82)  (3.34) 
             
unemployment  0.246*  0.245**  0.232*  0.211**  0.248*  0.228* 
  (1.80)  (2.08)  (1.80)  (2.46)  (1.84)  (2.01) 
Adjusted R
2   0.780  0.785  0.779  0.781  0.780  0.782 
Observations  77  77  77  77  77  77 
Specification tests             
N1  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N2  0.104  0.076  0.042  0.046  0.046  0.031 
N3  0.001  0.014  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002 
N4  0.612  0.539  0.519  0.808  0.409  0.389 
N5  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N6  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Notes:  see Table 1A.  31
Table 2  
Disaggregated Budgetary Data, excluding outliers  
Dependent variable: profits  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Method:  FE
  FE  FE 
Omitted fiscal variable:  surplus  current exp.  current exp., 
surplus 
capital expenditures  0.536*  0.603**  0.548* 
  (1.72)  (2.07)  (1.74) 
       
current expenditures   0.071       
  ( 0.69)     
       
direct taxation   0.268***   0.341***   0.285*** 
  ( 3.30)  ( 3.50)  ( 3.43) 
       
indirect taxation    0.597**   0.624**   0.696** 
  ( 2.45)  ( 2.82)  ( 2.58) 
       
other revenues    0.083   0.111   0.145 
  ( 0.51)  ( 0.76)  ( 0.88) 
       
budget surplus     0.096    
    (0.93)   
       
excessive wage   0.398***   0.406***   0.398*** 
  ( 7.16)  ( 7.55)  ( 6.54) 
       
reer   0.011   0.012   0.008 
  ( 0.57)  ( 0.66)  ( 0.43) 
       
consumption  0.361***  0.322**  0.405*** 
  (3.32)  (2.65)  (3.90) 
       
unemployment  0.275*  0.269**  0.230** 
  (1.82)  (2.05)  (2.54) 
Adjusted R
2   0.787  0.791  0.786 
Observations  71  71  71 
Specification tests       
N1  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N2  0.351  0.564  0.410 
N3  0.003  0.012  0.003 
N4  0.639  0.548  0.861 
N5  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N6  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Notes: see Table 1A. 
 
Table 3 
Disaggregated Budgetary Data, Alternative measure as Dependent variable 
Dependent variable: net  profits  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Method:  FE
  FE  FE 
Omitted fiscal variable:  surplus  current exp.  current exp., 
surplus 
capital expenditures  0.625*  0.668**  0.627* 
  (1.89)  (2.08)  (1.93) 
       
current expenditures  0.009       
  (0.10)     
       
direct taxation   0.295**   0.333**   0.294** 
  ( 2.76)  ( 2.32)  ( 2.72) 
       
indirect taxation    0.474*   0.434*   0.461* 
  ( 1.89)  ( 1.95)  ( 1.80) 
       
other revenues    0.339*   0.320*   0.332* 
  ( 1.93)  ( 1.90)  ( 1.86) 
       
budget surplus     0.051    
    (0.51)   
       
excessive wage   0.327***   0.326***   0.327*** 
  ( 4.93)  ( 5.04)  ( 4.96) 
       
reer   0.014   0.016   0.014 
  ( 0.68)  ( 0.78)  ( 0.70) 
       
consumption  0.667***  0.622***  0.662*** 
  (6.03)  (5.05)  (5.36) 
       
unemployment  0.265  0.291*  0.271** 
  (1.56)  (1.87)  (2.31) 
Adjusted R
2   0.644  0.646  0.649 
Observations  77  77  77 
Specification tests       
N1  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N2  0.064  0.018  0.056 
N3  0.113  0.143  0.100 
N4  0.279  0.219  0.246 
N5  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N6  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Notes: see Table 1A.   32 
 
Table 4 
Disaggregated Budgetary Data, Alternative control variables 
Dependent variable: net  profits  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Method:  FE
  FE  FE 
Omitted fiscal variable:  surplus  current exp.  current exp., 
surplus 
capital expenditures  0.362*  0.391**  0.354* 
  (1.89)  (2.05)  (1.81) 
       
current expenditures   0.034       
  ( 0.36)     
       
direct taxation   0.282***   0.323**   0.291*** 
  ( 2.88)  ( 2.73)  ( 2.91) 
       
indirect taxation    0.500*   0.520**   0.544** 
  ( 2.00)  ( 2.45)  ( 2.41) 
       
other revenues    0.345**   0.359**   0.374*** 
  ( 2.36)  ( 2.68)  ( 2.93) 
       
budget surplus     0.048    
    (0.62)   
       
Productivity  0.396***  0.391***  0.406*** 
  (6.74)  (6.87)  (7.27) 
       
Compensation   0.367***   0.362***   0.370*** 
  ( 5.40)  ( 5.31)  ( 5.64) 
       
Reer   0.017   0.018   0.017 
  ( 0.80)  ( 0.84)  ( 0.79) 
       
Iconsumption  0.088  0.088  0.093 
  (1.33)  (1.25)  (1.34) 
       
Unemployment  0.157  0.159  0.131 
  (1.03)  (1.18)  (1.33) 
Adjusted R
2   0.734  0.736  0.737 
Observations  77  77  77 
Specification tests       
N1  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N2  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N3  0.089  0.185  0.112 
N4  0.515  0.516  0.394 
N5  0.004  0.015  0.013 
N6  0.000  0.001  0.001 
Notes: see Table 1A.   33 
Table 5 
Disaggregated Budgetary Data, full disaggregation 
Dependent variable:  profits  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Method:  FE
  FE  FE
 
Omitted fiscal  variable:  surplus  surplus  surplus 
capital expenditures  0.588***  0.676***    
  (3.43)  (3.95)   
       
goods and services    0.150       
  ( 0.69)     
       
Wage expenditures      0.583*   0.521* 
    ( 1.88)  ( 1.74) 
       
Other goods and services     0.418*    
    (1.72)   
       
Non-wage expenditures         0.577*** 
      (3.94) 
       
interest payments   0.037  0.062  0.053 
  ( 0.24)  (0.46)  (0.37) 
       
other current expenditures   0.061   0.146   0.138 
  ( 0.60)  ( 1.20)  ( 1.09) 
       
direct taxation   0.287***      0.237** 
  ( 4.01)    ( 2.57) 
       
income taxation      0.277***    
    ( 3.22)   
       
other direct taxation      0.195    
    ( 1.51)   
       
indirect taxation   0.551**   0.632***   0.652*** 
  ( 2.43)  ( 2.95)  ( 3.16) 
       
other revenues    0.094   0.140   0.166 
  ( 0.65)  ( 1.17)  ( 1.37) 
       
budget surplus          
       
       
excessive wage   0.388***   0.354***   0.357*** 
  ( 7.69)  ( 6.91)  ( 7.19) 
       
reer   0.008   0.010   0.013 
  ( 0.45)  ( 0.48)  ( 0.57) 
       
consumption  0.353***  0.258*  0.235* 
  (3.69)  (1.87)  (1.96) 
       
unemployment  0.259*  0.245*  0.226* 
  (1.73)  (1.77)  (1.77) 
Adjusted R
2   0.774  0.794  0.798 
Observations  77  73  73 
Specification tests       
N1  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N2  0.075  0.075  0.021 
N3  0.003  0.097  0.032 
N4  0.659  0.803  0.697 
N5  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N6  0.001  0.000  0.001 
Notes: see table 1A.  34
Table 6 
Functional vs. Economic classification of expenditures 
Dependent variable:  profits  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Method:  FE  FE  FE  FE
  FE  FE  FE  FE
  FE  FE 
Omitted fiscal variable:  surplus  surplus  surplus  surplus  surplus  surplus  surplus  surplus  surplus  surplus 
expenditure category  -  gps  defense  education  health  housing  transport  social   recreation  economic  
productive expenditures   0.059   0.070  0.014   0.081   0.128   0.066   0.106   0.081   0.060   0.079 
  ( 0.59)  ( 0.17)  (0.14)  ( 0.95)  ( 1.37)  ( 0.14)  ( 1.10)  ( 0.67)  ( 0.60)  ( 0.66) 
                     
unproductive expenditures  0.022  0.022  0.024   0.072  0.016  0.023  0.020  0.226  0.012   0.040 
  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.18)  ( 0.44)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.81)  (0.07)  ( 0.18) 
                     
expenditure category      0.057   1.010**  0.619  0.232   0.058  0.883**   0.051  0.550  0.216 
    ( 0.52)  ( 2.12)  (1.37)  (1.24)  ( 0.57)  (2.44)  ( 0.22)  (0.30)  (0.72) 
                     
direct taxation   0.275**   0.276*   0.319**   0.292**   0.244**   0.275**   0.261**   0.294**   0.280**   0.290** 
  ( 2.22)  ( 1.85)  ( 2.83)  ( 2.58)  ( 2.10)  ( 2.13)  ( 2.54)  ( 2.56)  ( 2.35)  ( 2.48) 
                     
indirect taxation    0.637**   0.638**   0.811***   0.707**   0.687**   0.636**   0.706**   0.634**   0.617**   0.643** 
  ( 2.19)  ( 2.15)  ( 3.47)  ( 2.80)  ( 2.48)  ( 2.06)  ( 2.68)  ( 2.18)  ( 2.04)  ( 2.24) 
                     
other revenues    0.107   0.108   0.109   0.079   0.004   0.108   0.007   0.117   0.111   0.114 
  ( 0.57)  ( 0.55)  ( 0.74)  ( 0.40)  ( 0.02)  ( 0.51)  ( 0.03)  ( 0.63)  ( 0.57)  ( 0.61) 
                     
budget surplus                               
                     
                     
excessive wage   0.384***   0.384***   0.366***   0.436***   0.383***   0.384***   0.398***   0.360***   0.388***   0.360*** 
  ( 6.35)  ( 6.09)  ( 6.59)  ( 6.00)  ( 6.51)  ( 6.72)  ( 6.11)  ( 5.99)  ( 6.57)  ( 5.99) 
                     
reer   0.015   0.015   0.007   0.017   0.012   0.015   0.014   0.015   0.016   0.015 
  ( 0.60)  ( 0.60)  ( 0.30)  ( 0.68)  ( 0.45)  ( 0.58)  ( 0.69)  ( 0.61)  ( 0.61)  ( 0.61) 
                     
consumption  0.391**  0.391**  0.435***  0.368**  0.399**  0.390**  0.420***  0.393**  0.378**  0.399** 
  (2.70)  (2.69)  (3.33)  (2.56)  (2.79)  (2.87)  (3.29)  (2.56)  (2.61)  (2.63) 
                     
unemployment  0.236*  0.236*  0.312**  0.292***  0.273**  0.236*  0.267*  0.248*  0.238*  0.246* 
  (1.96)  (1.93)  (2.75)  (2.91)  (2.09)  (1.86)  (1.85)  (1.84)  (1.93)  (1.86) 
Adjusted R
2  0.775  0.771  0.799  0.785  0.784  0.771  0.798  0.774  0.771  0.774 
Observations  68  68  68  68  68  68  68  68  68  68 
Specification tests                     
N1  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N2  0.005  0.003  0.023  0.036  0.013  0.029  0.016  0.015  0.051  0.015 
N3  0.042  0.048  0.227  0.018  0.050  0.071  0.007  0.094  0.043  0.106 
N4  0.208  0.199  0.365  0.418  0.405  0.228  0.391  0.305  0.321  0.300 
N5  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N6  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.039  0.021  0.040 
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